This paper provides new evidence of gender differences in response to increased competition, focusing on important life tasks performed in a regular social environment. The analysis takes advantage of a major education reform in Ontario that exogenously increased competition for university grades. Comparing students pre-and post-reform using rich administrative data, I find that male average grades and the proportion of male students graduating 'on time' increased relative to females. Further, the evidence indicates that these changes were due to increased relative effort rather than self-selection. The findings have implications for the delivery of education and incentive provision more generally.
Introduction
Experimental evidence from several recent studies, notably by Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) , indicates that males perform better than females in the face of increased competition when carrying out specific laboratory tasks. 1 These findings are highly suggestive. They point to possible underlying differences in the cost of effort by gender, with effort expenditure becoming less costly for men relative to women in more competitive environments. To the extent that these differences carry over to important long-term tasks, they have the potential to explain -at least in part -several striking features of the US labor market, including the disproportionate presence of males in highly competitive jobs 2 and gender inequalities in pay.
It is natural to view differences in labor market outcomes as the result of long-run exposure to competitive environments in which individuals perform regular work-related tasks and are then evaluated according to a competitive selection process or tournament. Ideally, to learn about possible differential responses by gender to increased competition, one would like to mimic the essential features of such a setting. This would include individuals performing day-to-day tasks over an extended period -tasks that they were highly incentivized to care about -and drawing a contrast between performance in low-versus high-competition environments while controlling for all other relevant factors.
The pioneering experimental studies referred to above are able to vary competition exogenously and control very cleanly for other potentially confounding factors. Yet the tasks these papers have focused on -solving computer mazes and sprinting over short distances, for instance -are somewhat atypical. To lend credence to the notion that underlying gender differences in response to greater competition do indeed extend beyond the laboratory to regular activities in day-to-day life, this study analyzes the impact of an exogenous change in competition on gender performance differences in a regular social environment -the university classroom -focusing on life tasks that individuals have strong incentives to care about. In this instance, the tasks involve trying to master the material covered in university courses -somewhat analogous to skill accumulation in the workplace -with rewards (in the form of grades) being based on relative performance over the course of the academic year.
More specifically, the analysis makes use of data from a major education reform in Ontario's secondary school system that shortened high school by one year, from five years to four. As a consequence of this reform, which abolished the final year of high school (or Grade 13), two cohorts graduated from high school in June 2003, creating a so-called 'double cohort' of students and drastically increasing competition for university places that year. Given that capacity did not increase anything close to proportionately, this in turn increased the quality of the students who ended up being admitted to university. If universities grade on a fixed bell curve, which some did, then the reform made it harder to receive high grades in university; and in such circumstances, one would expect student effort to play a larger role in the determination of university grades.
The incentives to exert higher effort would increase alike for males and females, but if males are more positively (or less negatively) affected by an increase in competition, 3 then such cross-gender differences could result in a differential shift in effort, manifest as a relative change in performance when comparing male and female outcomes.
The first empirical goal of this paper is to see whether such a differential performance shift occurred, based on the increase in the level of competition in university classrooms due to the Ontario double cohort. 4 With that goal in mind, I examine the impact of increased competition on the gender performance gap using data from the University of Toronto. Several informative prior education studies use data from a single institution -for example, Berea College (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006) ), Dartmouth (Sacerdote (2001) ), the University of Toronto (Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009a) ), and a 'large Canadian university' (Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009b) and Lindo, Sanders and Oreopoulos (2010) ). In this case, the University of Toronto provides a valuable context to shed new light on the gender effects of increased competition for several reasons.
First, with more than 55,000 undergraduate students, it is one of the largest universities in North America and so affords very large samples. Second, I have access to rich administrative data that allow me to observe virtually error-free performance measures for students who attended university in a normal environment (e.g. before the double cohort) versus a more competitive environment (entering university in September 2003) , along with a set of useful controls. Third, the grading scheme guidelines at the University of Toronto clearly indicate a 'bell curve'-like marks distribution throughout this time period, unlike other Ontario universities.
The data make it possible to estimate a set of regressions showing whether the relative university performance of male students compared to females -i.e. the university gender grade differentialimproved in moving from a normal environment to a more competitive one, controlling for student ability. Using this measurement approach, I find that male students gained about 1 percentage point (or 11 percent of a standard deviation) over female students during their first year in university in response to the increased competition. While modest in size, I find the effect persists, remaining around 1 percentage point throughout students' four years of university. The increased competition not only affected student grades, but also influenced credit accumulation (especially for 'belowaverage' students) and on-time graduation rates, both suggesting that males became relatively more effective as competition increased.
The second empirical goal of the paper is to shed light on the reasons for this differential change in performance. In the observational setting of the double cohort, the performance change might be attributable to differential changes in effort by gender -the hypothesized channel -but also to differential selection and other changes by gender. Though student effort is not directly observable, my approach makes use of the richness of the administrative data to address the most likely potential self-selection issues and alternative channels. To the extent that selection and other confounding factors do not appear to be significant, this points to differential changes in effort by gender as the primary source of the measured performance differences.
On the selection front, the main concern is that competitive environments attract competitive individuals and repel non-competitive individuals. Thus one might expect males (and especially competitive males) to differentially select into the double cohort relative to females. Looking at information on all applicants, regardless of whether they actually enrolled or not, the evidence indicates that the double cohort did not have differential selection effects by gender. Specifically, the proportion female among applicants and enrolled students did not change significantly, comparing the pre-reform period with the double cohort; nor did female representation within the ability distribution (by high-school average quartile); and the proportion of female 'fast-trackers' -students from the Grade 13 program who graduated early and applied to university in 2002 -did not change significantly either. I also investigate whether the increased competition affected dropout and program-selection decisions differently by gender: the evidence does not show any gender differences in these decisions. Overall, self-selection bias in this context does not appear to be a cause for concern.
Ideally, one would randomly assign the competition treatment to some students and the control to others. But in the current observational setting, the students in the 'high competition' environment are clearly of higher ability than those attending university on the pre-reform period, on average. Therefore, one necessary assumption for identifying the impact of competition on the performance gender gap is that observable controls for ability are adequate.
One violation of this assumption serves as a potential threat to identification. Since competition might have been tougher, not only in university classrooms but in high school also, the mapping of student ability into high school grades could have changed in the following confounding way.
Suppose high school grades in the double cohort overestimated female student ability (relative to males), then this could result in one overestimating male student performance in university relative to females and falsely attributing this increase in performance to heightened university competition. This scenario would require that females were more stimulated by competition than males in both high school and university, but this differential would need to be smaller in university.
This seems unlikely given my findings relating to university performance: 1) the unconditional and conditional university grades both suggest that the relative performance of males increased following the double cohort, and 2) the female representation does not seem to have changed within the ability distribution of applicants as competition increased.
Nevertheless, I address this possibility using information on out-of-province students and students who attended a university prior to the University of Toronto, on the basis that the mapping of ability into grades is not likely to have changed for these students. Estimating regressions using only these students gives results that are very similar to the ones obtained using Ontario secondary school students. Also, quantile regressions do not suggest that the differential impact of competi-tion on performance by gender is driven by a specific type of student -whether low or high ability.
The evidence points to differential changes in effort by gender over the entire ability distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes existing research on gender and competition, and then explains how the Ontario double cohort can shed new light on this topic. Section 3 sets out a model examining the potential impact of increased competition in university, analyzing the implications for effort choice. Section 4 presents the data, and also evidence of increased competition at the University of Toronto. The estimation strategy is described in Section 5 and I present the main results in Section 6. Section 7 consists of a series of robustness checks, in particular shedding light on whether the results are driven by self-selection. Section 8 then investigates whether increased competition also affected performance beyond students' first year in university, and Section 9 concludes, drawing out implications of the analysis.
Background

Prior Literature
This sub-section discusses the well-known research in experimental economics that first examined how males and females respond to increased competition and also the small number of papers that have looked at this issue in an observational setting. 5
The experimental economics literature on competition and gender performance differences has been motivated primarily by the findings in Bertrand and Hallock (2001) . Those authors noted that women only represent 2.5% of the 1992-97 ExecuComp dataset, consisting of the top five executives in each firm of the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Smallcap 600. 6 Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) proposed and experimentally tested an explanation -aside from discrimination or occupational self-selection -as to why we might observe large gender differences in highly ranked (and highly competitive) labor market positions.
Specifically, Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) conducted a laboratory experiment in which participants (university students) had to solve as many computer mazes as possible in a given amount of time. While men and women performed equally in the non-competitive environment, when placed in a more competitive environment, men significantly improved their performance while women did not. The authors concluded that "women may be less effective than men in competitive environments." Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) presented evidence that this gender difference might hold at a young age as well, based on a field experiment in which children had to sprint over a certain distance in different competition settings. There also, boys' performance was enhanced by direct competition while girls' was not.
My paper investigates whether the findings in these pioneering studies also emerge in long-term tasks involving a regular social environment. There is a clear link between my paper and Gneezy, 5 For a more complete review of the literature on the topic, see Croson and Gneezy (2009) , and Niederle and Vesterlund (2010) .
6 Wolfers (2006) suggests that the female CEO representation is not improving as only 2.5 percent of new CEO appointments between 2000 and 2004 were females. Niederle and Rustichini (2003) : both studies compare performance across individuals and in both cases, one group receives the competition treatment while the other does not. The main differences lie in the contrasting nature of the tasks studied (solving computer mazes versus performing in university courses) and the random assignment, which is only possible in the experimental setting.
Note that the nature of the task studied here -long-term and mattering for future life outcomes -is key in gauging the potential of competitive gender differences to explain features of the labor market; Section 7 of my paper tackles the selection issue.
Few papers have studied the effects of an 'exogenous' change in competition on performance in observational (non-experimental) environments. Price (2008) looked at the effect of the introduction of the Graduate Education Initiative (GEI), which increased competition within Ph.D. programs, on the time to candidacy for students attending elite U.S. universities. The GEI sponsored fellowships intended to reward "students who made the quickest progress toward completing their degree" (Price 2008) . While males decreased their time to candidacy by ten percent, women were not affected by the GEI. My paper analyzes a more common type of activity that a large fraction of the population will have to deal with at some point in their life. In the course of doing so, it takes a close look at the potential self-selection impacts of increased competition.
Ors, Palomino and Peyrache (2008) studied gender difference in performance in the highly competitive entry exam to the Master of Science in Management program at one of France's top business schools (HEC Paris). They found that males outperformed females in the entry exam, while admitted female students outperformed their male counterparts during their first year at HEC -a less competitive environment, according to the authors. They also found that female HEC applicants outperformed male applicants in the baccalauréat exam, assumed to be a less competitive pre-application exam. 7 Note that the three types of exam studied byÖrs, Palomino and Peyrache (2008) not only differed in their competition level, but also differed in their format (e.g. oral versus written exams) and the skills (e.g. general versus management-specific knowledge) that they tested. As with Price (2008),Örs, Palomino and Peyrache (2008) do not focus on the potential impact of competition on gender differentials in self-selection. My paper is also related to Lavy (2008) in that both studies look at a regular competitive environment. Lavy (2008) examines a tournament-like pay scheme rewarding Israeli teachers who perform better than their peers. His identification strategy is aimed at testing whether, in a competitive environment, one's performance is affected by the gender mix of participants. My paper looks at differential gender responses in performance relating to an increase in competition, analogous to Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) . 7 Niederle and Vesterlund (2010) suggest using caution when comparing the performance distribution of admitted students to the performance distribution of applicants as the former is a (highly) truncated subsample of the latter.
The Ontario Double Cohort
A key challenge in estimating the impact of competition on performance in a natural environment is to find an exogenous source variation in the competition level faced by individuals. The abolition of Grade 13 offers such a source.
As part of a major reform to its secondary school system, the government of Ontario announced the abolition Grade 13 in 1997. Prior to this reform, Ontario students entered college or university after completing Grade 13, which contrasted with the other secondary school programs in Canada.
Following the reform, students were now expected to complete secondary school in four years (after Table 2 in Section 4.1).
3 Increased Competition, Bell-Curve Marking, and Effort
In this section, I first examine the impact of increased competition following the double cohort on the link between high school grades and university grades. In particular, I present predictions regarding the expected signs of the parameter estimates from regressing university grades on high school grades if a university grades its students based on a bell curve. This will allow me to verify later on that competition really did increase in university classrooms following the double cohort. I then present a simple model that illustrates a possible channel through which performance gender differences can emerge as competition increases: differential changes in effort incentives.
Increased Competition and Grades
This subsection makes explicit the way that increased competition can affect the link between ability (measured by high school grades) and university performance.
Suppose that, for every student i enrolled in university in year t, we observe a university grade, U i,t , and a high school grade, H i,t . Assume that the university grades on a fixed bell curve such that, every year, student university grades follow a normal distribution with the same mean µ U and variance σ 2 U . Further, assume that H i,t also follows a normal distribution, but with mean µ H,t and variance σ 2 H,t are allowed to vary over time. 11 We can link the two distributions using:
and
where b t is expected to be positive. Figure 2 illustrates the between high school and university grades. The top panel of Figure 2 presents the distribution of high school grades of students admitted to university while the bottom panel presents the distribution of university grades.
Assume that competition for university admission increases between t and t . As competition increases, the distribution of high school grades admitted to university will shift to the right -the average will increase from µ H,t to µ H,t -and, in turn, the variance, σ 2 H,t , will decrease. These changes in mean and variance are simply due to the limited admission capacity of the university.
This phenomenon is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 2 .
Since the university keeps the same performance distribution from year to year (i.e. µ U and σ 2 U remain unchanged), the increased competition will affect the link between high school grades and university grades. In the top panel of Figure 2 , we can see that σ 2 H,t decreases as competition increases. Therefore, b t will be larger than b t (from a less competitive year) to guarantee that equation (2) still holds. Also, since both µ H,t and b t increase, a t will decrease to ensure that equation (1) is satisfied.
The framework presented above makes two predictions regarding the parameter estimates from estimating an equation of the following form:
where U i,t is student i's university grade, H i is student i's high school grade and DC t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if student i is observed during the more competitive year. Equation (3) can
11 Figure 4 suggests that a normal distribution is a reasonable approximation to the actual grade distribution. Here, π and ρ will capture changes in the constant and slope parameters in equation (1) (i.e. π = a t − a t and ρ = b t − b t from the earlier discussion) following the increase in competition. If the university grades on a bell curve, we should first expect the slope coefficient to be greater (ρ > 0) and second, the intercept to be smaller (π < 0) in more competitive years. Note that these predictions are easily testable with the available data. The regression results in Section 6 suggest that ρ > 0 and π < 0.
Increased Competition and Effort in University
The previous model made explicit the link between competition, grades, and bell-curve marking. I
now present a simple model to analyze the potential impact of increased competition and bell-curve marking on the effort incentive in university classrooms assuming.
Imagine students with ability a will exert effort e when studying to acquire knowledge, K(a, e).
Assume that K(a, e) is continuously differentiable, increasing and concave in a and e. The cost of studying is given by a continuously differentiable function C g (a, e, l), increasing and convex in e and decreasing and convex in a -these assumptions yield well-behaved marginal cost and marginal benefit of effort schedules. The cost to studying also depends on the student gender g ∈ {f, m} and the level of competition l in the classroom. Increases in the level of competition will decrease the marginal cost of studying if students enjoy competition. Suppose that in the absence of competition (at l = 0), males and females have the same cost functions:
Therefore, females and males are expected to exert the same level of effort and perform equallythey have the same knowledge production and cost functions at l = 0.
Assume that males enjoy an increase in the level of competition more than females, in the sense that the marginal cost of effort decreases more for males as the level of competition increases: 12
Now, the university grades its students according to the following scheme:
where the university adjusts η l and λ l to satisfy its bell-curve marking scheme. In particular, the university is expected to increase the benefit to effort by increasing λ l (and to decrease η l ) in a more competitive year. 13 Student utility is simply defined by the difference between the university 12 The results are exactly the same if they dislike competition less than females. 13 In Appendix B, I present a model that looks at the impact of increased competition on the effort incentives set by a university that grades on a bell curve. I show that under mild conditions (depending on the complementarity between effort and ability), the university will increase λ l as competition for university admission increases.
grade and the cost of studying. Therefore, the student utility maximization problem is:
The first-order condition for this problem is
The question is whether male effort will increase more than for females when we move from a non-competitive environment (l = 0) to a competitive environment (l > 0). Figure 3 illustrates how female and male levels of effort will change following an increase in the level of competition.
The details relating to this comparative statics exercise are in Appendix B. First, recall that in the absence of competition (at l = 0), females and males are assumed to have the same knowledge production and cost functions. Therefore, in the absence of competition, females and males are will both choose an effort level equal to e * (a, l = 0). An increase in competition will affect both the marginal benefit (by increasing λ l ) and the marginal cost of exerting effort. The increase in marginal benefit will be the same for females and males, but the change in marginal cost will differ if males enjoy competition more than females. More specifically, the males will experience a more pronounced rightward shift of their marginal cost curve than females.
Consequently, male effort will shift from e * (a, l = 0) to e * m (a, l > 0) while female effort level will only shift from e * (a, l = 0) to e * f (a, l > 0) (in the Figure 3 ). Under these circumstances, an increase in competition is expected to differentially affect the effort level of females and males.
Data
In order to look at the effect of the increased competition in university classrooms on academic performance, I focus on students who enrolled at the University of Toronto -one of the largest The Faculty of Arts and Science combines three features necessary for the analysis of competition on grades. First, and most importantly, the institution analyzed must grade its students based (at least implicitly) on a bell curve. Unlike a number of Ontario university faculties, the Faculty of Arts and Science had specific guidelines for the marks distribution, clearly suggestive of a bell-curve marking scheme. 15 Second, the Faculty has large introductory classes -many of these classes are compulsory (for a given program) and some of them have more than 1,000 students -making it possible to get relatively precise estimates. Third, most study subjects offered by the Faculty were not affected by the Ontario Secondary School reform. 16 This is not the case with other faculties.
The data come from two sources of information that were linked using students' identification numbers: pre-university admission information and university academic histories. The university academic history contains 1) the numerical grades for all Arts and Science courses that the student completed, 2) the list of courses that the student dropped (along with the dates these courses were dropped), and 3) a dummy variable, 'on-time' graduation, indicating whether the student had graduated from university by July 1st of her fourth year (e.g., July 1st 2007 for 2003 students).
The main dependent variable consists of students' first year (credit-weighted) averages, on a 100-14 For related studies using college administrative data, see Sacerdote (2001) using Dartmouth College data, and Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos (2009), Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009a, 2009b) and Lindo, Sanders and Oreopoulos (2010) using data from a large Canadian university.
15 Until 2009, the "Academic Handbook: Course Information for Instructors" that is available on the University of Toronto Faculty of Arts and Science website (http://www.artsci.utoronto.ca) we could read that, although not required, experience suggests that there will normally be between 5% and 25% of A's, not over 75% of combined A's and B's, and not over 20% of combined E's and F's in large classes. Since 2009, the marks distribution guidelines are slightly broader. 16 The compression of the Ontario secondary school curriculum affected the delivery of material for some subjects and not others. For example, the Mathematics curriculum was affected, while the Biology curriculum was not (Morin 2010) . See King et al. (2002 King et al. ( , 2004 King et al. ( , 2005 and Morin (2010) for more details. point scale. 17 Although I eventually look at student performance from their first through fourth university years, I concentrate the analysis on first-year performance. An obvious advantage of doing so is that it mitigates much of the potential impact of course selection, as many of first-year courses are, as noted, compulsory given a specific program of study.
A nice feature of the data is that it contains pre-university admission information for students who applied to the Faculty of Arts and Science, regardless of whether their application was accepted or rejected. Hence, this information will be used not only to control for students' backgrounds but also to look for evidence of increased competition in university admissions. This information will also be crucial to investigate whether females tried to avoid the increased competition (more than males) by choosing 'less competitive' programs, or simply by not applying/enrolling to the university in 2003, which is plausible if one thinks that females are more likely to "shy away from competition" (Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) ).
For each applicant, I have the following information: a student identification number, the applicant's high school average, her/his year and month of birth, and her/his gender, the name older students. 19 Out-of-province students and students who already had some university experience before applying to the Faculty will be used in Section 7.3 for robustness checks. 20
The data contain an indicator of the secondary school curriculum (Grade 12 or Grade 13) the student graduated from. The G12/G13 indicator is necessary for performing the analysis with or without G12 students. There are pros and cons to including G12 students in the sample.
Focusing on G13 students (excluding G12 students from the sample) guarantees that, aside from potential differences in academic ability, students from 2001 and 2003 should be quite similar in 17 Students earn 0.5 credits for successfully completing a one-semester course and a 1.0 credit for successfully completing a two-semester course. As students take one-and two-semester courses, the student first year average is weighted by the credit units. I computed first-year averages for all students for which I observe two numerical grades by the end of the first year. Restricting the sample to students who took more courses or weighting the observations by the number of courses taken does not affect my results. I consider that students who report grades under 30 percent have, in fact, dropped the course. These course outcomes will be used, with the courses that were officially dropped, to see whether females (or males) were more likely to drop courses (or 'stop competing') in 2003. Again, including these grades when computing student average grades does not affect my results.
18 Students interested in a specific study program offered by the University of Toronto Faculty of Arts and Science have first to apply to one of the following general programs: Commerce, Computer Science, Humanities and Social Sciences, or Life Science. Enrolled status entails application acceptance (from the Faculty) and the student choosing to enroll.
terms of academic background (e.g. they come from the same secondary school program) and other dimensions such as maturity -since students have the same age. But, if Grade 13 had a significant impact on students' university preparation and if gender composition differs across G12 and G13, then not including G12 students could over-or underestimate the effect of the double cohort on gender differences in performance. In addition, Morin (2010) presents evidence that G12 students who entered university in 2003 were better-than-average students. If this is the case, and if the gender composition differs across G12 and G13 students, then excluding G12 students could also result in biased estimation of the competition effect, even if we assume no difference in university preparation across curricula. For this reason, the estimations were all done with and without G12 students. Results show that including or excluding G12 students give very similar estimates.
Finally, the secondary-school Mathematics curriculum was clearly affected by the reform (Morin 2010) . Since female and male students might have reacted differently to the change in Mathematics curriculum, all Mathematics courses were excluded from the analysis. 21 This should mitigate any potential bias due to differences across G12 and G13 university preparation. In practice though, including Mathematics performance in the university average does not affect my results.
Evidence of Increased Competition
The drop between 2001 and 2003 in the enrollment/application ratio presented in Table 1 already suggests a significant impact of the double cohort on university admission. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics used to look at the effect of increased competition on student university performance.
The key point coming out of Panel A is that the double cohort significantly increased competition for university admission and the quality (based on students' high school average) of enrolled As expected, G12 students are on average exactly one year younger than G13 students (see Panel A of Table 2 ). The student population is composed of a majority of female, comprising more than sixty percent of the population. Of note, the proportion of female did not change significantly between 2001 and 2003. This is important evidence, especially if one is concerned that there could be significant gender differences in the taste for competition. Table 2 presents the proportions of female students by high-school-average quartile to further investigate whether there were significant changes in the female representation. Females tend to be slightly less present in the bottom quartile. There was, however, no drastic change 
Panel B of
Estimation
The main estimation strategy used to gauge the effect of increased competition on gender performance differences is captured by the following extension of equation (3): 22
U i,t is a university performance measure (the student's university average, the number of university credits earned, or on-time graduation). The main outcome of interest is the student's first year university average. One of the main benefits of looking at first year performance is that during this year, the choice of courses is not as important as for later years, which can mitigate potential course selection issues. Furthermore, first year courses usually have very high enrollments.
H i is a measure of student ability (high school average), while M ale i and DC t are a male and a double-cohort-year dummy variables, respectively. Finally, X i is a vector of other personal characteristics. The coefficient of interest is β which represent the difference, across genders, in the effect of the double cohort. The coefficients π and ρ will capture common effects (to males and females) of the increased competition. Notice that the estimates of π and ρ are expected to be negative and positive, respectively (as in equation (3)). δ allows one to test whether (ceteris paribus) males perform better than females in university. X i will consist of controls like program fixed-effects and age, which will be added to the equation in some specifications. Controlling for age could be useful when including G12 students in the analysis. Table 3 and quantile regression results presented in Section 6.2 will support the idea that the difference in the shifts in performance distributions captures the effect of the increased competition (as opposed to changes in student characteristics). Table 3 presents results from estimating equation (5) with the student first year university average as the dependent variable for different sets of controls, and for different subsamples. The results in Table 3 will shed light on 1) whether it became harder to get high grades as a consequence of the double cohort (i.e. whether the university graded on a 'bell curve'), and 2) whether (on average) males' performance significantly improved relative to females.
Results
Competition and First Year Performance
Columns (1) to (3) only include students who graduated from the G13 program while columns (4) to (6) also include students who graduated from the G12 program. The effect of the increased competition on the university grading policy slope and intercept coefficients (π and ρ in equation for the increased quality of students in their classrooms. This is not surprising if we think that many universities recommend implicitly or explicitly a bell-curve marking scheme. Not surprisingly, the effect of the double cohort on university grades is statistically significant. An 'average' 2003 The estimated change in the gender performance gap due to the increased competition (1.01 percentage points) is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but modest (0.11 s.d.), suggesting that males coped better with the increased competition than females. These results are in line with the findings of Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) . 24 Note that, contrary to Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) , I
can only measure a relative (as opposed to absolute) change in performance due to the increased competition, since the university seems to be grading on a bell-curve (given the estimated coefficients for ρ and π).
23 88 × 0.107 − 11.311 ≈ −1.88. The null hypothesis H0 : π + 88ρ = 0 is rejected at a 1 percent confidence level. In order to convert the effect in terms of standard deviations, I use the 2001 university-average standard deviation (9.02) as found in Table 2 . −1.88/9.02 = −0.208. 24 Although the results suggest that males coped better with the increased competition than females, they were still negatively affected (in terms of performance) by this increased competition. A 2003 male student with an 88-percent high-school average had a statistically significant (at a 5 percent level) 0.87 percentage point disadvantage when compared to a similar student who entered university in 2001.
The effect of the double cohort varies significantly across the student population. For example, imagine two female students, one with a high school average one standard deviation (4.4 percentage points) below and the other one standard deviation above the 2003 mean high school average (88 percent). The student below the mean would have had a 2.35 percentage point disadvantage from being part of the double cohort. For the student above the mean, the disadvantage would be significantly smaller (1.40 percentage points).
Allowing for program-fixed effects and age control (columns (2) and (3)) does not alter the findings. The coefficients on high-school average and 'Male × DC' are very stable across specifications.
Marking schemes differ across programs. After controlling for high school average, the results show that the 'toughest' program would be Life Science while the 'easiest' would be Humanities and Social Sciences. Finally, the age effect is statistically significant but small and negative: when comparing the youngest and oldest students coming out of the G13 program, we expect the youngest students to have a 0.75 percentage point advantage over the oldest.
Columns (4) to (6) replicate the estimates in columns (1) to (3) using the complete sample of Ontario students, including both G13 and G12 students. The inclusion of G12 students does not affect the estimated impact of increased competition on the gender difference in performance; it remains around 1 percentage point.
One might think that the effect is modest enough not to have any impact on students' GPA.
Using student GPA (on a four point scale) instead of the credit-weighted average (on a 100 point scale) used in Table 3 gives very similar results. The estimates for 'Male × DC' when using students' GPA fluctuate between 0.08 and 0.09 GPA points, or between 0.1 and 0.11 standard deviations (see Table A .1).
Since gender composition could potentially have changed at the course level (even if it did not at the program level), I estimated similar regressions replacing the student university average as dependent variable by individual course grades, and added course-fixed effects in some specifications to see whether the estimated effect of competition on the gender performance gap is affected by controlling for course selection. Results suggest that the inclusion of course fixed-effects does not affect the estimated impact of competition on the performance gap; the estimated effect is around 1 percentage point (see Table A .2).
Heterogeneity
The least-squares regressions capture the effect of increased competition on the average femalemale performance difference. Although informative, they may mask important heterogeneity in the impact of competition. The least-squares estimates could, for example, be driven by a specific group of students, such as male students in the upper tail of the performance distribution, who react more to competition than the rest of the student population. In this case, the increased competition would affect the shape of the performance distribution. In order to investigate this possibility, I estimated Specification (6) in Table 3 using a quantile regression methodology proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) . This methodology allows one to estimate the impact of 'Male × DC' on the quantiles of the unconditional university performance distribution, shedding light on a possible increase in performance dispersion due to the increased competition. Figure 6 plots the quantile regression 'Male × DC' estimates for the 5th to the 95th quantiles and its 90 percent confidence interval band. 25 The effect of competition on the gender performance gap seems relatively stable over the performance distribution as the least-squares point estimate is covered by the entire quantile regression band. What is clear from the quantile regression results above is that estimated effects of the increased competition on the gender performance gap found in Table 3 are not overwhelmingly driven by students performing well in university. They further suggest that the difference in the shift in performance distributions found in Figure 5 is a reasonable illustration of the impact of the increased competition on the gender performance gap. 26
Selection Issues
The results presented so far suggest that male students coped better with the increased competition than females. These results do not take into account the possibility that students are more or less free to drop out of courses/programs, to enroll, and to apply to university, or that competition might have increased not only in universities, but in secondary schools also. This section investigates self-selection problems and looks at the potential consequences of increased competition at the secondary-school level on the estimates presented so far. I start by considering the possibility that males dropped out of courses disproportionately more than females as a consequence of the double cohort, which would (probably) lead me to overestimate the gender difference in performance in 2003. Next, I use the available admissions data to investigate any gender differences in the enrollment or application decisions -the admissions data allow me to observe any student who applied to the Faculty of Arts and Science (whether they were accepted or not). I also look at pre-university competition and its potential impact on the link between students' ability and their high-school average (the ability measure used in this paper).
Dropouts
If there are important gender differences when it comes to dropping a course, then the estimates presented above may over-or under-estimate the full impact of the increased competition on university performance. If, for example, the 2003 male students that were more adversely affected by the increased competition dropped out of courses in a disproportionate way relative to their female counterparts, then the findings presented in Section 6.1 could overestimate the gender performance differential -the results could be due to selection. In order to investigate this issue, I looked at individual courses, and constructed a dummy variable equal to 1 if a course was dropped, and 0 otherwise. 27 I then estimated a linear probability model, using the same six specifications used to estimate the effect of competition on grades, to test whether female and male dropout decisions were affected differently by the increased competition. Table 4 shows that males did not drop out more than females when facing increased competition, supporting the idea that the gender differences found above are not due to omitting students who failed to complete courses. The double cohort did increase the percentage of courses being dropped, all else equal: the estimated increase in dropout rates for an 'average' student is between 1.4 and 2.2 percentage points. This is significant since dropped courses represent about 8 percent of observed course outcomes in the sample. Overall, results from Table 4 do not suggest that results presented in Table 3 are due to gender differences in the dropping-out decision process.
Participation
The experimental economics literature not only suggests that males perform better when faced with more intense competition than females, but also that females might shy away from it. 28 If 27 Note that courses for which the final grade is below 30 percent are also considered as dropped. 28 Experimental studies such as Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval (2005) , and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that males are more inclined to participate in competitive activities. Flory, Leibbrandt and List (2010) suggest that this gender difference also holds in a natural environment. Dohmen and Falk (2011) suggest that risk attitudes play a role in explaining this finding, while Booth and Nolen (2009) and Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009) suggest that the role of nurture is important in this context. Interestingly, Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009) find that females' and males' tastes for competition differ whether we are looking at a patriarchal or matrilineal society. Males are more was dropped, 0 otherwise, using a linear probability model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a disproportionate number of females avoided the double cohort (e.g. by delaying their university application), and if these females would have been more adversely affected by the increased competition, then the estimates presented in Table 3 might underestimate the impact of competition on the performance gap. In order to investigate this possibility, Table 5 presents numbers on the proportion of female students by status (applied and enrolled), and by year. Both the proportions of female applicants (Panel A) and the proportions of female among enrolled students (Panel B) suggest that females did not try to avoid the double cohort more than males. Whether I look at the female proportions among all students, or by quartiles (based on high school average), I do not see any economically or statistically significant differences in the proportions of female applicants or enrolled students. These results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of G12 students. The cost of delaying university enrollment by a year might be large compared to the cost of entering competitive than females in a patriarchal society, while the opposite is true in a matrilineal society. See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a more complete (and more general) discussion of gender differences in preferences. a more competitive environment, which could explain why we do not see changes in the female proportions of applicants and enrolled students between 2001 and 2003. results from testing the null hypothesis of equal proportions across years against the alternative hypothesis that they are different. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. has the smallest proportion of female students (around 23 percent).
Pre-University Competition
Results presented so far assume that a student high school grade is a good indicator of academic ability. Since students knew (since 1997) that university admissions would be more competitive in 2003 than in previous years, it is possible that they reacted by studying more in high school. The competition level would therefore increase not only in university, but also prior to that. In this case, the link between academic ability and high school grades might have changed between 2001 and 2003, representing a potential source a bias for the estimator. Two scenarios must be considered.
First, assume that competition was intense at the high school level, which stimulated males more than females, as suggested by the experimental economics literature, resulting in males outperforming females with similar academic ability. Consequently, 2003 male academic ability could be overestimated by their high school average, which would then translate into underestimating the impact of increased competition on the gender university-performance gap. This situation should not be a major concern since I already find a positive effect, and it would only make it larger.
The second scenario would be that females were actually more stimulated by the increased high school competition than males. This seems unlikely given that Table 3 suggests that males increased their university performance relative to females in the more competitive year. Nevertheless, it is still be possible in principle that females were more stimulated by competition in both high school I investigate this possibility by re-estimating the regressions presented in Table 3 , but using only students whose ability measurement is not likely to have been affected by the double cohort (i.e. out-of-province students and students that attended a university prior to the University of Toronto). The results are very similar to the ones using Ontario secondary school students. In particular, the coefficient estimates for 'Male × DC,' although imprecise, fluctuate between 0.85 and 1.61 depending on the model specification. This finding supports the idea that the estimates presented in Table 3 are not driven by Ontario female student academic ability being significantly overestimated in 2003. 29
After the First Year
Results from Table 3 suggest that the increased competition following the Ontario double cohort had an impact on the gender gap in first year university performance. I now show that the double cohort actually affected the performance gap during most of these students' undergraduate years. Table 6 presents estimates of the competition effect on the gender performance gap for students' first 29 As an additional robustness check, I re-estimated the regressions presented in Table 3 on a pooled sample of Ontario and out-of-province students, and students who attended a university prior to the University of Toronto. Using a full set of dummy variables and interaction terms (i.e. using a triple-difference estimation approach), I test whether the academic ability of Ontario female students is significantly overestimated in 2003 (relative to Ontario male students). If this is the case, then the coefficient estimate of an interaction term between an Ontario secondary school dummy (say 'ON') and 'Male × DC' would be significantly different from 0. The coefficient estimate of this Table 3 . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(Year 1) to fourth year (Year 4) in university. Estimates next to 'Year 1' are taken from Table 3 .
The estimation strategy is exactly the same as the one used above, except that the dependent variables are students' upper year averages. Aside from a small drop for students' third year, the effect of increased competition is surprisingly stable across years. The estimated coefficients using students' fourth year averages vary between 0.75 and 1.18, being very close to the ones obtained using students' first year averages. Despite being of modest size initially, the competition effect could accumulate over time, affecting the gender gap in attrition rates, in credit accumulation, and, ultimately, in on-time graduation rates. I now turn to these.
Attrition
From year-to-year, the sample size of observed students decreases as can be seen in Table 6 . Some students will change program, change university, or simply quit. If males and females differ in their decision to stay in school (or in the Faculty), the estimates found in Table 6 could misrepresent the evolution of the competition effect. In particular, if some females were forced to quit school due to bad performances in their first year, then the results from Table 6 might be underestimating the effect of competition on the performance gender gap. Table 7 investigates this possibility. Using a similar estimation strategy as above, I regress (using a linear probability model) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student dropped out of the sample after one, two, or three years respectively.
interaction term, although imprecise, is very close to 0 in all specifications. This further suggests that the academic ability of Ontario female students is not significantly overestimated in 2003. Notes: The table presents 18 coefficient estimates for 'Male × DC' capturing the effect of competition on the gender gap in the probability to drop out of the sample (used in Table 3 ). These estimates are obtained using a set of dummy dependent variables 'Dropped from Sample After X Years' equal to 1, for a specific student, if I do not observe any grades for this student after X years (in university). These dummy variables are regressed on the same regressors and under the same six specifications used in Table 3 . The estimation was done using a linear probability model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Eighteen estimates of the 'Male × DC' parameter are presented in Table 7 . All estimates are relatively small, and statistically insignificant, suggesting that dropouts are not driving the results in Table 6 .
Credit Accumulation
While not strong enough to affect important decisions like dropping out of university, the competition effect might have been strong enough to slow down students and affect credit accumulation, and the probability that they graduate on time. In order to better measure the magnitude of the long-lasting effect of competition on the performance gender gap, I now look at student credit accumulation. Table 8 presents coefficient estimates for the effect of competition on the gender differential in credit accumulation. The number of credits accumulated after X years includes the number of credits earned during year X, but also the number of credits earned over the previous years. Therefore, the estimated effects presented in Table 8 should be seen as cumulative effects.
The results in Table 8 do not suggest that the effect of the increased competition on the performance gender gap was strong enough to affect the number of earned credits after a year. But, when I look at the effect of competition of earned credits after two years, the estimate for 'Male × DC' becomes significant for four out of six specifications. What is also surprising is that the estimates seem to increase in magnitude as we look at the effect after three and four years, though the standard errors also become large. In fact, when I look at students with high school average 88 percent and below -students who are more likely to fail or drop a course -the estimates show the same pattern, but they become larger (between 0.8 and 1.2 credits after four years) and statistically significant. petition on the gender gap in the number of credits accumulated after X years (in university).
The number of credits accumulated after X years is regressed on the same regressors and under the same six specifications used in Table 3 . The number of credits earned is zero for year X (X =2, 3, or 4) if the student is not observed in year X. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Graduation
One final aspect of the academic performance that I consider is on-time graduation. As the effect of increased competition seems to be long lasting, it could affect the probability that a student graduates on time (i.e. during the summer following her fourth year). In Table 9 , I present results from regressing an 'on-time-graduation' dummy variable on similar control variables used in the previous regressions. 30 The 'on-time-graduation' variable is equal to 1 if the student has graduated from university by July 1st of her fourth year. Unfortunately, the data do not allow me to observe 2003 students after their fourth year. Estimates of the double cohort effect on the gender difference in the probability of graduating on time are statistically significant and large. They range from 6.2 to 8.0 percentage points. To put the size of the estimates in perspective, about 40 percent of students observed in Table 3 graduated on time. Prior to the double cohort, male students were less likely to graduate on time than females, the difference being around 6 to 8 percentage points.
This difference completely vanished for double-cohort students. 31
The estimates presented here must be interpreted with caution. As the abolition of Grade 13 affected university admission standards in 2003, so it could affect the admission standards for graduate school in 2007. Hence, while part of the effect estimated here could be due to performance, 30 The results presented in Table 9 are from linear probability models. The results from estimating probit models are very similar.
31 The null hypothesis H0 : δ + β = 0 (i.e. that the sum of the 'Male' and 'Male × DC' coefficients is equal to zero) is not rejected at conventional confidence levels in any of the six regressions. Note that the effect of the double cohort is not statistically significant based on the 'Double Cohort' and 'HS Average × DC' coefficient estimates. Once I drop the 'HS Average × DC' variable from the regression, the 'Double Cohort' coefficient estimate changes to around −0.1 and becomes significant at 1% percent. The 'Male × DC' coefficient estimate remains unchanged at around 0.07. These results are not presented here but are available upon request. Notes: The table reports the estimates of regressions of a dummy dependent variable equal to 1 if the student graduated by July 1st of her fourth university year; 0 otherwise. The estimation was done using a linear probability model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
it is also possible that these estimates are capturing the effect of strategic behavior. Some students may have been tempted to delay graduate school applications by a year. As mention earlier, females may not 'embrace' competition as much as males. If graduate-school bound female students delayed (more than males) their graduation to avoid the double cohort, part of the competition effect presented above would be due to this behavior. Note that this behavior is not likely to explain all of the effect since only a fraction of undergraduate students will apply to graduate school. In order to have an idea of how much of the estimates found above could be due to strategic behavior, I estimated similar regressions as those presented in Table 9 excluding students with high school average above 88 percent to concentrate on students who are less likely to apply to graduate school. The 'Male × DC' coefficient estimates are actually larger for 'lower-ability' students, as is the case for earned credits, suggesting that the results presented in Table 9 are not due to such strategic behavior. Table 9 suggest a clear difference in the reaction to increased competition by females and males, and that results from Table 6 are not due to male students taking more time to graduate.
Conclusion
This paper has provided new empirical evidence of gender performance differences in response to increased competition, focusing on long-term tasks carried out in a regular social environment: the university classroom. The exogenous increase in competition generated by the abolition of Grade 13 allowed me to assess whether the findings from the experimental economics literature carry over to tasks that a large fraction of individuals of a given age perform over an extended period and which they have strong incentives to care about. As such, they help to link the experimental evidence to competitive gender differences in important life outcomes, including those in the labor market.
My results indicate that gender differences in performance under increased competition do carry over to an important non-experimental setting: performance while in university. The estimated effects are modest in size but are precisely estimated, and appear to persist: the increased competition had an economically significant positive impact on males' on-time graduation rates, especially for below-average students. The evidence also supports the view that the results are due to differential changes in effort by gender, rather than self-selection, as indicated by findings regarding the decisions to apply to university, enroll if accepted, and drop out of courses/programs. (The modest nature of the differential effects on performance by gender helps explain why the self-selection effects are muted.)
While the results point to differential effort changes by gender, the nature of the task studied in this paper also allows for competition to affect performance through a peer channel -an important feature of workplace environments. The double cohort, combined with the limited capacity of universities to expand rapidly, increased the quality of admitted students, and so of peers. Hence the estimates presented here are likely to capture the combined (net) effect of two potentially significant mechanisms by which competition could explain stylized facts about the labor market. If female students benefit more from higher quality peers, as suggested by recent evidence in Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006) , then my results are more surprising, as they would represent conservative estimates of the impact of increased competition on the male-female performance differential. Still finding a significant increased-competition impact suggests that the 'pure' competition effect due to changes in effort could be more important than the peer effect in explaining gender differences in performance.
The results from this study have several implications. First, they indicate that male and female performance responds differently to an increase in competition for regular every-day tasks that are long-lasting and for which the outcomes matter to participants. This underlines the potential for competition to explain some of the gender inequality found in the labor market. The results also have implications for the delivery of education (e.g. single-sex versus coed schooling) and for student achievement assessment. In terms of the former, my results suggest that the optimal level of competition associated with classroom activities for student learning (or effort) may be different for females and males and that one should take this finding into account when weighing the pros and cons of single-sex education. One advantage of single-sex classrooms (or schools) would be to allow teachers to adjust the competition level according to the gender of the student body.
In terms of the latter, the results suggest that performance assessment measures (e.g. bell-curve marking) found in many universities may not be gender-neutral: a given performance measure can favor females (or males), depending on the level of competition inside the classroom. Such a finding naturally raises the question whether we should expect similar results for high school students who will not go to college -for potential high-school dropouts in particular. If so, the performance assessment measures could be made more 'competitive' by grouping males (who represent the majority of high school dropouts) together and using tournament-based evaluations or within-class ability streaming, without negatively affecting female students.
For future work, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of competition in university on gender differences in performance once in the labor market -beyond the scope the data I analyze in this study. Doing so would speak even more directly to the relative importance of gender competition versus discrimination and occupational self-selection in explaining important gender differences in the labor market, referred to in the Introduction. It would also be interesting to explore the strength of gender differences in tasks where absolute, rather than relative, performance can be measured. This would help clarify whether, on the one hand, the cost of effort rose less for males relative to females, or on the other, it fell by more in more competitive environments. One could also examine possible gender effects for tasks where the role of peers is more rather than less important, building on the analysis in Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006) . Notes: The dependent variable in these sets of regressions is the student's first-year university GPA. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Notes: The dependent variable in these sets of regressions is a first-year university course grade. Clustered standard errors (at the course level) are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Appendix A -Alternative Performance Measures
Students expect the university to mark on a bell curve. More specifically, they expect that, every year, the average grade in university will be:
where E(K(a, e)|t) is the average knowledge of students enrolled in year t. The variance of university grades is also expected to remain constant across time:
Students take the mean and the variance of knowledge (E(K(a, e)|t) and var(K(a, e)|t)) as given (i.e. they do not think they can individually affect the average performance or its variance).
Student utility is simply defined by the difference between her university grade and the effort she exerted. So her utility maximization problem is: max e η t + λ t K(a, e) − C(a, e)
The first-order condition for this problem is λ t ∂K(a, e * ) ∂e − ∂C(a, e * ) ∂e = 0
We can see that student effort will increase as λ t increases. Now, we can re-write equation (10) to see what will affect λ t :
We can use equation (11) 
That is, higher ability students will exert more effort. Since de * da is strictly positive and that C(a, e) and K(a, e) are continuously differentiable, there is a one-to-one correspondence between a and e.
We can therefore define H(a) ≡ K(e * (a), a)
Now we can look at what happens when competition for university admissions increases from one year to the other. It is easy to imagine that if high school grades are determined in a similar fashion to university grades, the ability threshold that determines whether a student is accepted in university will go up during the more competitive year. Therefore, the variance of university-student ability should decrease while their average ability will increase as universities become more selective-the ability distribution is being truncated from below.
We can see what will happen to the variance of H(a) if the variance of a decreases using a 
Under mild conditions H(a) is concave. 33 If H(a) is concave then as competition increases,
H (E(a)|t) will decrease and so will var[H(a)|t]. This means that the variance of knowledge var(K(a, e)|t) will be smaller and λ t larger in a competitive year and consequently, the optimal level of effort, e * , will be higher in a competitive year. This discussion indicates that although effort is not observable here, one could imagine that the increased benefit to effort is one important channel through which competition affects students' performance.
